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injury to another, the court could take into account the relevant circumstances
such as the degree of relationship between the parties, the severity of the injury
and the proximity of the plaintiff to the scene. Once the court determines
whether a duty should be imposed, the jury, under the usual standards for
determining the weight of the evidence, could then decide whether the de-
fendant failed in his duty. Liability would result if the defendant, in the circum-
stances of the case, should have reasonably foreseen fright or shock severe enough
to cause substantial injury in a normally constituted person. Such an approach,
recommended by numerous authorities,9 8 adopted in the English courts,9 9 and
advanced by the dissent in the Amaya decision,100 would obviate the necessity
for the mechanical rules surrounding the claims for mental distress at the appre-
hension of injury to another.
PAUL T. MURRAY
OBSCENITY: ROTH GOES TO THE MOVIES
In 1915 the United States Supreme Court held that movies were no more
than a form of commercial entertainment, and were not to be regarded in the
same class as other communication media.' It was not until 1952 that the
Court reversed this judgment and held that motion pictures clearly convey
information and thought, and thus are entitled to the guarantees of free speech
provided by the first and fourteenth amendments. 2 However, the Court was
quick to add that "it does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places.
That much is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect
to other media of communication of ideas." 3 Thus it becomes proper to ask
which movies will not receive the protection of the Constitution. This comment
will concern itself with movies that contain material relating to sex, and the
possible limitations4 of the protection which may be afforded to them.
In Roth v. United States0 the United States Supreme Court held that if
the presentation of the material falls within the category of "obscenity [it]
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,"0 because
98. Blessing, The Right to Mental Security, 16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 540, 568 (1964); Brody,
supra note 90; 2 Harper & James, Torts 1035-38 (1956).
99. Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [19391 1 K.B. 394.
100. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 316, 379 P.2d 513, 526, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 46.
1. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915)
(". .. [Tihe exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded ...
as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion."
2. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). See note 12 infra.
3. Id. at 502-03.
4. E.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). See generally,
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954).
5. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
6. Id. at 485.
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obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social importance. ' ' 7 But Mr. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority,s pointed out that "sex and obscenity are not
synonymous ... [and the] portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific
works, ... [is entitled to] the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press"0 if such portrayal does not fall into the unprotected classification
of obscenity. The court then set forth as an approved' ° test for obscenity
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest.""
Motion pictures have been held to come within the protection of the first
amendment as forms of expression. 12 The Roth13 test, though first recognized in a
case involving erotic literature has now also been utilized by the courts to deter-
mine whether or not motion pictures are obscene.' 4 However, the precise issue
of what the "dominant theme of the material taken as a whole" 5 means when
applied to movies has not yet been fully answered by the Court. It is clear
that courts must read and consider the whole book10 or magazine, 17 and not
merely isolated passages before condemning the work. Books that contain
passages that have vividly described the sexual act of intercourse, mentioning
in detail every facet of the activity, including descriptions of the genitals have
been protected.' 8 However, the Supreme Court has not yet been asked to decide
whether a similar, isolated portrayal would be protected on a movie screen in
7. Id. at 484. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Supreme
Court Rev. 1, 7.
8. Joined by Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark and Whittaker. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren concurred in result, and Mr. justice Harlan concurred in a companion case, Alberts
v. California, but dissented in Roth v. United States. Mr. Justice Douglas was joined in
dissent by Mr. Justice Black.
9. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
10. Id. at 489.
11. Ibid. See generally Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Develop-
ing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 49-58 (1960).
12. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) the Court concluded
"[Tlhat expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free
press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent that language in the
opinion in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra [236 U.S. 230 (1915)], is out of
harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it." See United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
13. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
14. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). See also Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the
State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35
(1957); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. City of Chicago, 184 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ill. 1959);
American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 13 Ill. App. 2d 278, 141 N.E.2d 56 (1957).
15. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
16. E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). See also Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 382 (1957).
17. E.g., Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355
U.S. 371 (1958), reversing, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summer-
field, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957). But see 1 Chaffee,
Government and Mass Communications 217 (1947).
18. E.g., Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 200 N.E.2d 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d
71 (1964) ("Fanny Hill"). But cf. People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963) ("Tropic of Cancer").
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light of the fact that movies must be judged on the basis of the dominant theme
taken as a whole. 19 The Court has extended the constitutional freedom of ex-
pression protection to movies containing a scene which showed the face of a
woman experiencing sexual orgasm20 but has not yet been asked whether a
movie containing a scene showing a complete clinical examination of fornica-
tion, for example, is permitted even though the movie's dominant theme does
not fall within the prohibited category set down by the Roth test. It will be
the purpose of this comment to examine this problem in light of the decisions
of the Court.
The Supreme Court, in Jacobellis v. Ohio,2' considered the movie "Les
Amants" ("The Lovers"). The movie contained a scene which showed a woman's
facial expressions during sexual orgasm ".... induced, suggested off screen, by
cunnilingus." 22 The Ohio Supreme Court had divided the film into eighty-seven
minutes of "vapid drivel"23 and ". . . three minutes of complete revulsion during
the showing of an act of perverted obscenity."2 4 In reversing the conviction
of Jacobellis for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film, the United States
Supreme Court applied the Roth test to movies for the first time. Mr. Justice
Brennan, delivering the opinion of the Court, reaffirmed the Roth standard and
also recognized that in order for material to be classified as obscene it must go
"... substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or repre-
sentation . . ." of matters relating to sex.25 A seemingly further requirement
appeared to be established in that material ". . . that has literary or scientific
or artistic value or any other -form of social importance, may not be branded
as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection." 2
Thus the Court, in applying Roth, made it clear that the test also included
artistic value and limits of candor in the determination of obscenity.27 It would
seem from Jacobellis that the material must be without artistic value, and
exceed the customary limits of candor and must have as its dominant theme
an appeal to an average man's prurient interest, when viewed as a whole, by
the nationalP community.20 Each portion of the test must be satisfied in order
19. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
20. Ibid.
21. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
22. Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1063, 1079 (1964).
23. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 173 Ohio St. 22, 28, 179 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1962).
24. Ibid.
25. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
26. Ibid.
27. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1063, 1064 (1964).
28. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964): "We thus affirm the position
taken in Roth to the effect that the constitutional status of an allegedly obscene work must
be determined on the basis of a national standard." Id. at 195. Mr. Chief Justice Warren in
his dissent made it clear that he did not agree: "I believe that there is no provable 'national
standard,' and perhaps there should be none. At all events, this Court has not been able to
enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one." Id. at 200.
See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,
45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 108-14 (1960).
29. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
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to deny material constitutional protection. In examining "Les Amants" Mr.
Justice Brennan noted that the film received favorable as well as unfavorable
reviews, and was rated by two critics of national stature as among the best
films of the year.30 He further concluded that the movie ".. . is not obscene
within the standards enunciated in Roth v. United States .... "31 Thus on June
22, 1964 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a movie showing the facial
expressions of a woman during orgasm induced by cunnilingus was not obscene.
Less than three months earlier a similar problem had faced the New York
Court of Appeals. The Board of Regents of the University of the State of New
York directed the elimination of two scenes from the motion picture "A Stranger
Knocks" before granting a license to the Trans-Lux Distributing Corporation
for the exhibition of the film. In so directing, the Board applied New York's
motion picture licensing statute32 which requires an examination of motion
picture films and the issuance of a license for their exhibition "unless such film
or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of
30. Id. at 196. For an interesting discussion of the problems relating to the evaluation
of critics see Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1063 (1964).
31. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, forthrightly said: "I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that." Id. at 197.
Mr. Justice Goldberg noted that "the love scene deemed objectionable is so fragmentary
and fleeting that only a censor's alert would make an audience conscious that something
'questionable' is being portrayed." Id. at 197-98.
Mr. Justice Brennan, before concluding his opinion for the Court, felt warranted to
make the following comment:
We recognize the legitimate and indeed exigent interest of States and localities
throughout the Nation in preventing the dissemination of material deemed harmful
to children. But that interest does not justify a total suppression of such material,
the effect of which would be to "reduce the adult population . . . to reading only
what is fit for children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383. State and local
authorities might well consider whether their objectives in this area would be better
served by laws aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material
to children, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination. Id. at 195.
See generally Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censor-
ship by Age Classification, 69 Yale L.J. 141 (1959).
32. N.Y. Educ. Law § 122 provides:
The director of the division or, when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local
office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion picture film sub-
mitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene,
indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition
would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such
director or, when so authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he
shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal
and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto.
§ 122a 1. For the purpose of section one hundred twenty-two of this chapter, the
term "immoral" and the phrase "of such a character that its exhibition would tend to
corrupt morals" shall denote a motion picture film or part thereof, the dominant
purpose or effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays acts of
sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents
such acts desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior. Compare Freed-
man v. Maryland, 85 S. Ct. 734 (1965); Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 85 S. Ct. 952 (1965).
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such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to
crime. "33
The first scene presents a man and a woman on a beach embracing
and caressing one another, and ends in a view of the head and shoulders
of the woman with facial expressions indicative of orgasmic reaction.
The second scene presents the woman astride the man on a bed. Their
bodily movements are unmistakably those of the sexual act and the
woman's face again registers emotions concededly indicative of orgasm.
This scene is the dramatic climax of the picture because of the coinci-
dence of the woman's passion with her sudden realization, through the
exposure of a tell-tale scar, that the man is her deceased husband's
murderer. As respondent's [Trans-Lux] affidavit puts it: 'The
climax is a groan of pleasure and pain, a dramatic and eloquent ex-
pression of the persistent ambivalence in the relationship.'
3 4
The Appellate Division annulled the Board's determination in a memoran-
dum decision noting that the sexual acts are implied rather than demonstrated
and are an integral part of the movie.35 The four judge majority30 directed the
licensing of the film. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the two scenes must be eliminated before a license may be issued. 7 Judge Burke,
writing for the majority, found the "filmed presentation of sexual intercourse,
whether real or simulated, is just as subject to State prohibitation as similar
conduct if engaged in on the street."3 8 By thus labeling the scenes conduct and
not speech the court avoided the need to apply the Roth test.80 Judge Burke
seems to have asserted the following: fornicating in the public street is con-
33. Ibid.
34. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Ed. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New
York, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 90, 198 N.E.2d 242, 243, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (1964).
35. Matter of Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Ed. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of
New York, 19 A.D.2d 937, 244 N.Y.S.2d 333 (3d Dep't 1963). The case was ordered trans-
ferred to the Appellate Division in accordance with the provisions of N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 1296 now N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7804. Record, pp. 2-3.
36. Bergan, P. J., Gibson, Reynolds and Taylor, J. J., in the majority; Herlihy, J.,
dissenting.
37. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Ed. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 242, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964).
38. Id. at 92, 198 N.E.2d at 245, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 860. Compare Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). See note 12 supra and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the reasons given for laws banning obscenity and public displays of immorality
see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391
(1963).
39. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
14 N.Y.2d 88, 96, 198 N.E.2d 242, 247, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857, 863 (1964): "[Blecause the ma-
terial assigned as obscene in this case is not, in my view, speech, as opposed to conduct, it
need not come within the test laid down in Roth v. United States (354 U.S. 476, supra)
that, in speech cases, obscenity must be the dominant theme of the work as a whole." Com-
pare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). But see Excelsior Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144 N.E.2d 31, 165 N.Y.S.2d
42 (1957) which held that a movie showing the activity of nudes of both sexes at play in a
nudist camp must be licensed. This private conduct could be banned if done on Judge
Burke's public street as may public fornication. The nudes were in a private camp and the
couple in "A Stranger Knocks" were in a private house but yet in the latter the scenes were
adjudged conduct and in the former protected by freedom of speech. Excelsior Pictures
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 182 F. Supp. 400 (NJ). Ill. 1960).
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duct and may be proscribed because of its danger to society.40 This danger
also applies to filmed representations of conduct and thus they may also be
proscribed. Judge Scileppi, in his concurring opinion went a step further:
".. . the dominant theme test is, I believe, inapplicable to motion pictures.
The two offending scenes must be judged separately as would still photo-
graphs."141 Judge Williams, 42 noting the contention that the production must
be considered as a whole, found "its over-all merit . . . not such as to support
scenes of obscenity. And the contention that the two scenes of visible sexual
intercourse are necessary to maintain the high cultural level of the picture speaks
little for the social value of the production 'as a whole.' -43 Judges Dye, Fuld
and Van Voorhis dissented and voted to affirm upon the majority memorandum
opinion in the Appellate Division.
44
It seems clear, upon examining the scenes from "A Stranger Knocks" in
light of the protected scene in "Les Amants" that the majority view of the
New York court may not be sustained. Both movies showed only the face of
a woman during sexual orgasm. Although Trans Lux's appeal to the Supreme
Court was successful and the New York court was reversed, the per curiam
decision48 indicates that the issue of obscenity was never reached. The sole
case cited4 6 was decided, not on any issue of obscenity, but on the procedural
delay compounded by a movie licensing statute in Maryland that is quite similar
to that of New York.
47
The Supreme Court, having protected movies that show the face of a
woman during orgasm may presumably now be asked to protect a film that
contains a scene that shows the entire body during a sexual act. The major
question, therefore, is whether the Roth test, as described in .acobellis, will
protect movies that contain a scene or even several scenes, portraying with
clinical detail an act of fornication, fellatio or cunnilingus, for example, and
not merely the facial reflections of the act.
The constitutional requirement that obscenity be determined by the domi-
nant theme of the material considered as a whole, and not by isolated passages,
is applicable to motion pictures and plays as well as to books.4" However, it
was not until 1964 that the Supreme Court, in .acobellis, decided this precise
40. See Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
391 (1963).
41. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
14 N.Y.2d 88, 99, 198 N.E.2d 242, 249, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857, 865-66 (1964).
42. Designated pursuant to N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 2(a) in place of Judge Bergan,
disqualified because of his having decided the case in the Appellate Division. See supra
note 36.
43. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
19 N.Y.2d 88, 99, 198 N.E.2d 242, 249, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857, 866 (1964).
44. In the Matter of Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the
State of New York, 19 A.D.2d 937, 244 N.Y.S.2d 333 (3d Dep't 1963).
45. Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of
New York, 85 S. Ct. 952 (1965).
46. Freedman v. State of Maryland, 85 S. Ct. 734 (1965).
47. Supra note 32.
48. See cases cited note 14 supra.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
point. Although in 1959 the Court reversed New York's censorship
4" of the
movie "Lady Chatterley's Lover," it found the case in such a procedural posture
as to make the determination unnecessary. Professors Lockhart & McClure noted
that the movie contained "scenes which showed the gamekeeper-lover help Lady
Chatterley unbutton her blouse and unzip her dress, reach with his hand under
her dress to note that she had come to him with no undergarments and caress
her buttocks, and which showed them lying in bed in an apparent state of
undress before and after consummation of their love.""0 The New York Ap-
pellate Division had held that, in applying constitutional standards, Lady Chat-
terley's Lover was not obscene.Y' This decision was reversed by the New York
Court of Appeals, 2 but in so doing the Court subtly recast the issue. The Board
of Regents, the Court of Appeals said, had denied a license to Lady Chatterley's
Lover because the statute required such denial to "motion pictures which are
immoral in that they portray 'acts of sexual immorality ... as desirable, accept-
able or proper patterns of behavior.' "5 Then, the New York Court ruled that
the state may refuse to license a motion picture that "alluringly portrays
adultery as proper behavior ' 'a4 even though it is not obscene'5 and further found
the film did just that." Thus on appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the precise issue of whether this scene was obscene was not raised.5 7 "The Court
of Appeals [having] unanimously and explicitly rejected any notion that the
film is obscene"5 8 the Supreme Court reversed the determination of New York's
highest court that the movie may not be licensed because of the alluring por-
trayal of adultery as proper behavior. Thus it was quite unnecessary for the
Supreme Court even to view the film in order to hold that New York may not
"prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an
idea-that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior."50
Two years earlier, the Supreme Court failed to give us any firm guide lines
when, in its now famous series of per curiam decisions,00 it reversed without
49. Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of The State of New York,
4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958).
50. Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-What
is Obscene?, 7 Utah L. Rev. 289, 294 (1961).
51. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 4
A.D.2d 348, 350, 165 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683-84 (3d Dep't 1957).
52. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 4
N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958).
53. Id. at 351, 151 N.E.2d at 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 40. (Emphasis in original.)
54. Id. at 358, 151 N.E.2d at 201, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
55. Id. at 361, 151 N.E.2d at 203, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
56. Ibid.
57. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
360 U.S. 684 (1959). Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, was joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan. The remaining four Justices con-
curred in result. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 11, at 40-42.
58. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 360
U.S. 684, 686 (1959).
59. Id. at 688. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Supreme
Court Rev. 1, 28.
60. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), reversing 244 F.2d
432 (7th Cir. 1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957), reversing 247 F.2d 148
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opinion a United States Court of Appeals decision 6 ' upholding obscenity censor-
ship of the motion picture "The Game of Love." The movie was described by
the United States Court of Appeals as follows:
. . . from beginning to end, the thread of the story is supercharged
with a current of lewdness generated by a series of illicit sexual intima-
cies and acts. In the introductory scenes a flying start is made when a
16-year-old boy is shown completely nude on a bathing beach in the
presence of a group of younger girls. On that plane the narrative pro-
ceeds to reveal the seduction of this boy by a physically attractive
woman old enough to be his mother. Under the influence of this experi-
ence and an arrangement to repeat it, the boy thereupon engages in
sexual relations with a girl of his own age. The erotic thread of the
story is carried, without deviation toward any wholesome idea, through
scene after scene. The narrative is graphically pictured with nothing
omitted except those sexual consummations which are plainly suggested
but meaningfully omitted and thus, by the very fact of omission,
emphasized.62
Examining the four objectionable movies3 which the Supreme Court has
protected one finds that fornication or similar activity was not in fact shown
but instead was suggested or mirrored in the face of an actress. A close ex-
amination of the opinions of the Justices makes it clear that they may be quite
unwilling to allow actual portrayal of sexual activity. Mr. Justice Clark pro-
vided a hint when he found that "no grounds for confusion, however, were
a statute to ban 'pornographic' films, or those -that 'portray acts of sexual im-
morality, perversion or lewdness.' If New York's statute had been so construed
by its highest court I believe it would have met the requirements of due process.
Instead, it placed more emphasis on what the film teaches than on what it
depicts. There is where the confusion enters. '64 Mr. Justice Stewart 65 took pains
to make clear that the Court had based its conclusion on the fact that the New
York Court of Appeals decision rejected "any notion that the film is obscene"'66
and that the license was denied because the film "approvingly portrays an
adulterous relationship, quite without reference to the manner of its portrayal."
67
Mr. Justice Harlan granted "that the abstract public discussion or advocacy
(9th Cir. 1957) ; One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1957); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d 114
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
61. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
62. Id. at 436. (Emphasis added.)
63. Trans-Lux Dist. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
85 S. Ct. 952 (1965). ("A Stranger Knocks") ; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) ("Les
Amants") ; Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
360 U.S. 684 (1959) ("Lady Chattefley's Lover"); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
355 U.S. 35 (1957) ("The Game of Love").
64. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
360 U.S. 684, 702 (1959). (Emphasis in original.)
65. Supra note 57.
66. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York,
360 U.S. 684, 686 (1959).
67. Id. at 688. (Emphasis added.)
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of adultery, unaccompanied by obscene portrayal or actual incitement"08° may
not be proscribed.
Such care in limiting their opinions may suggest the Justices realized that
they might very well be faced with a much different problem if it were argued
that the manner of portrayal itself was obscene. By thus leaving this question
open, the court could, in an individual case by case formulation, 9 examine the
area of portrayal using the dominant theme test.
Roth AND A PROPOSED MODIFICATION
At one time isolated passages were considered sufficient to deprive material
of protection from censorship if they affected even the most susceptible persons,7°
This test, frequently attacked by courts,7' was finally rejected in 1957 in Roth
v. United States.72 No longer could mere isolated descriptions or phrases justify
a denial of constitutional freedom of speech. The courts must now examine
how the "dominant theme of the material taken as a whole"7 3 appeals to the
average man's prurient interest. Although the Supreme Court gave birth to
the Roth test in a case involving alleged pornographic literature the Court has
now applied it to movies as well.74
However, it is clear that the inclusion of a vivid description of sexual
activity within a book is not quite the same as its vivid portrayal upon the
screens of our nation's theaters.75 While the idea has not been expressly articu-
lated by the courts, it may be argued that when dealing with motion pictures a
stricter version or application of the Roth test may be needed. There would
be justifiable alarm should motion picture directors be allowed to insert into
their movies portrayals of sexual activity that are not germane to the dominant
theme. When requiring that a book be judged as a whole, courts frequently
68. Id. at 705. (Emphasis added.)
69. Id. at 696. "But, except in capital cases, we have to thread our way. Term after
Term, through the particular circumstances of a particular case . . .in order to ascertain
whether due process was denied in the unique situation before us."
70. Regina v. Hicklin, [18681 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by
the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well have encom-
passed material legitimately treating sex. See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity:
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 49 (1960); Lockhart &
McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 392
(1954).
71. E.g., United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) in which
District Judge Learned Hand wrote his now famous attack on the Hicklin test.
72. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
73. Id. at 489.
74. See cases cited note 14 supra.
75. Although the Supreme Court has not yet held any motion picture to be obscene, the
Court did uphold the constitutionality of Newark, New Jersey city ordinances which prohib-
ited lewd, obscene or indecent shows and performances. Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City
of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957). See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 140 (1962):
"... [Mlotion pictures may be deemed different even from television in impact and most
signally in the numbers and nature and situation of any single audience; movies, like the
theater, address themselves to groups of people in public places, not to the individual in the
home." See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 93-94 (1960).
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refer to the relevance of the passages alleged to be obscene.7 6 The "relevancy
of the objectionable parts to the theme" 77 is a "persuasive piece of evidence"
78
in determining the dominant effect of the book.79 If the questioned portions are
found to be relevant to the theme, courts tend to hold the book not obscene.
s °
Conversely, if the parts are deemed irrelevant, the book is usually found to
be obscene.8 '
Books that contain lurid passages, sprinkled throughout and not intending
to convey a specific mood, have been denied constitutional protection. 8 Books
that use such descriptive passages to create and further a desired mood, such
as D. H. Lawrence's "Lady Chatterley's Lover" have been protected.83 Thus
it may be suggested that the courts should examine the relevancy of the ob-
jectionable scene within a movie just as in the past they have examined the
relevancy of such material within challenged literature. It may be further
suggested that the courts will require a much higher degree of relevancy in
light of the requirement that the scene may not go beyond the customary limits
of candor.8 4 Should the offensive scene be deemed irrelevant to the dominant
theme of the movie there seems to be little justification for protecting it from
the censor's shears. This higher requirement may stem from two reasons. When
a reader encounters such a passage in a book he is free to use his own imagina-
tion in visualizing the activity described. He may picture the behavior as luridly
as he desires, but he need not dwell on the description if he finds it too offensive.
While it is true that a momentary glimpse of lurid behavior may not be as offen-
sive as a lingering close-up, the behavior still remains offensive. On the other
hand, should the activity be displayed upon a movie screen the viewer has no
effective way to limit its impact. He must sit through the scene, even though
he finds it to be blatantly offensive, or leave the theatre. The problem of a rele-
vance requirement for movies can be explained by comparing a movie version
to the original passage in the book. The author may require considerable dia-
logue and descriptive narrative to establish for the reader the desired mood or
character behavior. But a picture may well be worth a thousand words. The
76. E.g., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934);
Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81 N.E.2d 663 (1948).
77. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934).
78. Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
Minn. L. Rev. 295, 346 (1954).
79. E.g., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934);
Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 81 N.E.2d 663 (1948).
See Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn.
L. Rev. 295, 346 (1954).
80. E.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd,
276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Lady Chatterley's Lover").
81. E.g., People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963)
(Henry Miller's "Tropic of Cancer").
82. Id. at 124, 192 N.E.2d at 716-17, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (1963).
83. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 276
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
84. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
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movie may more readily create the same desired impact on the viewers without
portraying each detail described in words by the author. It follows that fre-
quently much of the description required by written material would be irrele-
vant (and possibly also unnecessary) to the artistic creation of a movie.
The second issue arises when the objectionable activity is found to be
relevant to the dominant theme, such as Lady Chatterley's adulterous behavior
with her lover. Certainly a pristine heroine would have created a far different
work of literature than that intended by Lawrence. However, a clinical exami-
nation of such behavior need not always be necessary to convey the desired
theme. In 1945, Massachusetts85 held the book "Strange Fruit" to be obscene
because the court found the author could convey her message without the inclu-
sion of the objectionable material.s6 In the light of Roth, a more satisfactory
test would allow determination of the relevancy of the objectionable portion to
the theme as a whole by considering the ". . . author's sincerity of purpose, a
standard of relevancy that recognizes what is sometimes called 'literary neces-
sity'--the author's need to use whatever words and passages he feels will pro-
duce the over-all effect he hopes to achieve."87
Certainly the insertion of an objectionable scene into a movie must also
be necessary if the scene is to survive88 For example, should the director of a
movie wish to convey the dramatic effects of rape upon its victim it would not
be necessary to show the actual penetration. The face of the actress could
conceivably better portray the pain, shock and embarrassment of the deed than
a crude examination of the specifically violated areas. The application of these
two requirements, relevancy and necessity, may seem to place the courts in
the difficult position of instructing authors how to formulate their theme and
how to convey it.89 However, such requirements would tend to prevent objection.
able activity from being cast upon the movie screen. Since the Supreme Court
has already taken upon itself the necessity of determining the artistic value
of a literary endeavor, °0 it may also examine the relevancy and necessity of
objectionable inclusions. In determining the relevancy and necessity of the ob-
jectionable portions the court could examine the author's sincerity of purpose. 1
The application of this test would afford examination of the author's testimony
or that of expert witnesses regarding the over-all effect desired and that actu-
85. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945). But see Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 n.26 (1957).
86. Id. at 557, 62 N.E.2d at 847 (1945): "[T]he matter which could be found ob-
jectionable is not necessary to convey any sincere message the book may contain .. "
87. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Community
Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 91 (1960).
88. Id. at 94.
89. Id. at 91.
90. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). See United States v. One Book
Entitled "Contraception," 51 F.2d 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
See generally Note, 39 N.Y.UL. Rev. 1063 (1964).
91. Lockhart & McClure, suPra note 87, at 91.
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ally created by the inclusion of the offensive material.92 As Judge Clark,93
writing of D. H. Lawrence's "Lady Chatterley's Lover" pointed out:
Obviously a writer can employ various means to achieve the effect he
has in mind, and so probably Lawrence could have omitted some of
the passages found "smutty" by the Postmaster General and yet have
produced an effective work of literature. But clearly it would not have
been the book he planned, because for what he had in mind his selec-
tion was most effective, as the agitation and success of the book over
the years have proven. In these sex descriptions showing how his
aristocratic, but frustrated, lady achieved fulfillment and naturalness
in her life, he also writes with power and indeed with a moving tender-
ness which is compelling, once our age-long inhibitions against sex reve-
lations in print have been passed ...
The same is true of the so-called four-letter words found particu-
larly objectionable by the Postmaster General. These appear in the
latter portion of the book in the mouth of the gamekeeper in his tute-
lage of the lady in naturalness and are accepted by her as such. Again
this could be taken as an object lesson at least in directness as com-
pared to the smirk of much contemporary usage, which (perhaps
strangely) does not seem to have offended our mailmen. In short, all
these passages to which the Postmaster General takes exception---in bulk
only a portion of the book-are subordinate, but highly useful, elements
to the development of the author's central purpose. And that is not
prurient.
9 4
EXAMINING A HYPOTHETICAL SCENE IN LIGHT OF Roth AND
OF ITS RELEVANCY AND NEcESSITY
Recognizing that the Supreme Court may well be reluctant to allow the
actual sexual activity to be portrayed on the screen, will the Roth test permit
its deletion? Roth requires only that the dominant theme of the material
viewed as a whole must not appeal to the prurient interest. Assume a director
began a motion picture with beautiful scenery and aesthetic commentary on
the magnificence of the Grand Canyon. Progressing from the Grand Canyon
our director shows the mental and physical benefits of outdoor recreation. While
advocating the pleasures of such activity he vividly portrays the actor and
92. Id. at 93-94. A questioned scene in a motion picture may be just as relevant to
its dominant theme as the challenged episodes and words in the unexpurgated edition
of Lady Chatterley's Lover. Indeed, the need for this requirement is particularly
acute with motion pictures because of the ease with which censors can and do order
the deletion of particular scenes before exhibition of the film, a technique not
applicable to books which as a practical matter must be accepted or rejected as a
whole. This does not mean that the visual impact of a motion picture is to be dis-
regarded, or that a motion picture can show sexual scenes with as much frankness
as they may be described in books. But it does mean that scenes in motion pictures
cannot be considered in isolation, apart from their relevance to the dominant theme
of the motion picture considered as a whole.
93. Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark of the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit.
94. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 438-39 (2d Cir. 1960). (Emphasis
added.)
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actress having sexual intercourse with a complete lack of inhibition. Assume
further that this portrayal runs for only a few short minutes and for the re-
mainder of the film our heroes continue to enjoy the scenery and their vacation
in nature. Applying Roth, the director would argue, the film is constitutionally
protected. The dominant theme of the movie is how beneficial it is to commune
with nature. Surely, he argues, this theme appeals to no one's prurient interest.
Defending the questionable scene, he again points to Roth and argues that the
material must be viewed as a whole and a two-minute isolated segment of ob-
jectionable portrayal within a two-hour movie is not sufficient cause to deny
its licensing.
It may be suggested that a way to prevent this offensive material from
creeping into our films under the alleged protection of the Roth test is to
require that the inclusion of the scene be relevant and necessary to convey the
central theme of the movie. Examining our hypothetical movie in light of these
two additional requirements will provide a more justifiable result. The inclusion
of the questioned scene is not relevant to the dominant theme. The benefits of
sexual activity are not relevant to the benefits of nature. But assuming for the
sake of argument that the insertion of such a scene is relevant, is the actual
portrayal necessary? It can be shown that in order to convey the sexual act it
is not necessary to portray the entire act. Many movies have conveyed such
activity without resort to its graphic portrayal.
Thus is it suggested that the Court when viewing motion pictures that
contain a scene or several scenes that portray sexual activity apply a modified
test: Is the insertion of the challenged scene relevant and necessary to convey
a dominant theme, even though such a theme viewed as a whole, would not
appeal to the prurient interest of the average person applying contemporary,
community standards?
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is cautiously charting its course through the murky
waters of obscenity. It has done so painstakingly to avoid sweeping generali-
zations that might prove to be useless in new situations. The Court has indi-
cated that not all movies will be protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. It is suggested that the problems involved in the censorship of motion
pictures are peculiar to that medium of communication. Pornographic scenes
should not be protected by virtue of their being surrounded by innocuous
material. Such scenes should be required to be relevant to the dominant theme
and further, to be necessary to convey such a theme. The writer is confident
that each dominant theme, found to be protected by the Roth test, can be
expressed without resorting to clinical examinations of sexual behavior.
JOHN T. O'MARA
